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Abstract 
Euthanasia in Belgium is not limited to terminally ill patients. It may be applied to patients 
with chronic degenerative diseases. Currently, people in Belgium wish to make it possible to 
euthanize incompetent patients who suffer from dementia. This article explains the Belgian 
law and then explores arguments for and against euthanasia of patients with dementia. It 
probes the dementia paradox by elucidating Dworkin’s distinction between critical and 
experiential interests, arguing that at the end-of-life this distinction is not clearcut. It argues 
against euthanasia for patients with dementia, for respecting patients’ humanity and for 
providing them with more care, compassion, and good doctoring. 
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Life is real! Life is earnest! 
And the grave is not its goal; 
Dust thou art, to dust returnest, 
Was not spoken of the soul. 
 Henry Wadsworth Longfellow, A Psalm of Life 
 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
This is the third of a series of “First Do No Harm” articles that concern the policy and practice 
of euthanasia in Belgium.1 Euthanasia is defined as a practice undertaken by a physician 
intentionally to end the life of a person at his explicit request. Since the enactment of 
the Euthanasia Act in 2002, biannual reports are being published by the Belgian Federal 
Control and Evaluation Commission, established by the government in September 2002, 
assigned to monitor the law’s application. In 1998, 4 years before the legislation of the 
Belgian Euthanasia Act, a nationwide survey estimated that 1.3% of all deaths resulted from 
euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide (Deliens et al., 2000, 1806). A constant increase 
in registered euthanasia cases has been observed, predominantly in the Flemish part of 
Belgium (Deliens et al., 2000; Bilsen et al., 2009, 1119–21;Smets et al., 2010).2 
Approximately one of seven terminally ill patients dying at home under the care of a General 
Practitioner (GP) expresses a euthanasia request in the last phase of life (Meeussen et al., 
2011, 1068). A Flanders (the Dutch-Flemish speaking part of Belgium) 2010 study shows 
that euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide occurred in 2% of all Flemish deaths 
(Chambaere et al., 2010, 896). This rate was higher than that in 1998 (1.1%) and in 2001 
 
 
 
 
1 
The first two are Cohen-Almagor (2013, 515-21) and Cohen-Almagor (2015, 625–29). Further 
papers will concern euthanizing patients who are tired of life, and euthanizing children. 
2 
See also VoxEurop, 2011, August 23. Rise in assisted deaths. VoxEurop [On-line]. 
http://www.voxeurop.eu/en/content/news-brief/878961-rise-assisted-deaths    (accessed    October 
15, 2015). 
2  
 
 
(0.3%) (Bilsen et al., 2009, 1119). The annual figures are constantly rising at a rapid pace: 
235 in 2003; 495 in 2007; 704 in 2008, and 1,133 in 2011 (de Diesbach et al., 2012, 3). In 
2012, there were 1,432 cases and in 2013, 1,816 euthanasia cases were reported (Caldwell, 
2014). 
 
This article concerns the practice of euthanasia of patients with dementia. At present, people 
in Belgium  are contemplating enlarging the scope of  the law to include such patients. 
The Euthanasia Act which stipulates euthanasia only for competent patients has paved the 
way to ending lives of incompetent patients (Chambaere et al., 2010, 895–6). The article 
opens with background information on the Belgian law and then goes on to explore 
arguments for and against euthanasia of patients with dementia. Contra Ronald Dworkin, it 
is argued that patients who suffer from dementia should not be euthanized. We should 
respect their humanity and provide them with more care and treatment, not death. Four 
arguments are put forward against euthanizing patients with dementia; two concern the 
physicians—beneficence and medicine-as-a-profession—and two concern the patients—the 
fluidity of life and the unattractiveness of death. 
 
II. THE BELGIAN LAW 
On January 20, 2001, a commission of Belgium’s upper house voted in favor of proposed 
euthanasia legislation, which would make euthanasia no longer punishable by law, provided 
certain requirements are met (Weber, 2001, 372). According to the Euthanasia Act, 
physicians who perform euthanasia do not commit a crime if they comply with the statutory 
requirements. The Act stipulates in Art 3 No 1 (Belgian Act on Euthanasia, 2002): 
The physician who performs euthanasia commits no criminal offence when he/she ensures 
that 
 the patient has attained the age of majority or is an emancipated minor, and is legally 
competent and conscious at the moment of making the request; 
 the request is voluntary, well considered and repeated, and not the result of any external 
pressure; 
 the patient is in a medically futile condition of constant and unbearable physical or mental 
suffering that cannot be alleviated, resulting from a serious and incurable disorder caused by 
illness or accident; 
 and when he/she has respected the conditions and procedures as provided in this Act. 
An earlier proposal of the Euthanasia Act contained a change of the Penal Code. It stated 
that the provisions concerning murder were not applicable if and when the conditions of the 
Act were observed. However, that proposal met fierce objections of some senators who 
argued that no exceptions can be made to the rule “Thou shalt not kill.” The legislators thus 
decided not to change the Penal Code (DeBondt, 2003, 301). DeBondt further explains that 
the focus of the Act is the free will of the patient asking for euthanasia. The Act states a 
number of requirements that should be met before the performance of euthanasia would be 
legal. The majority of these requirements as well as the concept of the will of the patients are 
seen as “civil law” concepts. Thus, this Act is, in the first place, a civil law act.3 
 
On October 25, 2001, Belgium’s Senate approved the law proposal by a significant majority: 
44 for, 23 against, 2 abstentions, and 2 senators who failed to register a vote. In society at 
large, an opinion survey showed that three quarters of those asked were broadly in favor of 
legalizing euthanasia (Osborn, 2001; Deliens and van der Wal, 2003, 1239–40). On May 16, 
2002, after only 2 days of heated debate, the Belgian lower house of parliament endorsed 
the bill by 86 votes in favor, 51 against and with 10 abstentions (Vermeersch, 2002, 394– 
7; Griffiths,  Weyers,  and  Adams,  2008,  304–29).4 The  legalization  of  euthanasia  was 
 
3 
Personal email communication (September 26, 2014). 
4 
One referee commented: The majority in the parliament is radically in favor of the right to self- 
disposal of life and body. After the crisis in the abortion debate (the refusal of the Belgian King to sign 
the law), Belgian politicians decided to leave ethical issues to the decision of members of parliament. 
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finalized without the broad involvement of and consensus among the medical professions 
(Smets et al., 2011, 581). 
 
The legislation lays out the terms for doctors to end the lives of patients. Potential 
candidates for euthanasia need to reside in Belgium to be granted this service. Patients 
must be at least 18 years old and have made specific, voluntary, and repeated requests that 
their lives be ended. At least 1 month must elapse between the written request and the 
mercy killing (Belgian Act on Euthanasia, 2002; Cohen-Almagor, 2009a, 436–9). The 1- 
month requirement is valid only when the patient is not considered as “terminally ill” (i.e., 
neurological affections like quadriplegia). 
 
III. EUTHANIZING PATIENTS WITH DEMENTIA 
One study showed that 21.1% of patients whose lives were terminated without explicit 
request suffered from dementia (Chambaere et al., 2010, 895–6). In 2009, it was decided 
not to prosecute Dr. Marc Cosyns after he euthanized an 88-year-old woman who asked to 
die but was notterminally ill. She was not fully lucid and had not given written consent. The 
patient’s own physician had opposed the euthanasia request (Baklinski, 2009; Cohen- 
Almagor, 2009b, 208–10). 
 
In 2008, Belgian author Hugo Claus died by euthanasia while suffering from Alzheimer’s. 
Jacqueline Herremans, president of the Belgian association for the right to die in dignity, said 
that all the guarantees provided for in the law, including a visit to a psychiatrist, were 
“certainly respected” (La Dépêche, 2008). According to a member of the official committee 
evaluating euthanasia cases, it was likely that Claus “still in the early stages of Alzheimer’s, 
made the decision while he still had his faculties” (La Dépêche, 2008). Bert Anciaux, culture 
minister for Belgium’s Dutch-speaking Flanders region, explained the timing of Claus’ death 
by saying that he wanted to leave with pride and dignity (La Dépêche, 2008). 
 
Death with dignity should always be sought. But euthanizing patients with dementia is 
morally problematic. Euthanizing patients who do not suffer from somatic illnesses is highly 
controversial due to the complexity of the situation.  Such decisions require taking into 
account the psychological needs of the patients, the influence and psychological situation of 
their intimate caregivers, the susceptibility of patients to depression and demoralization, the 
patients’ ability to understand and to process information, as well as their emotional state. 
 
The Belgian Federal Control and Evaluation Commission had on various occasions 
endorsed euthanasia cases of patients who suffered from depression and dementia (de 
Diesbach et al., 2012, 6). In the Netherlands as well, there were cases in which patients with 
dementia were euthanized with the help of a physician (Berghmans, 2012). The Belgian and 
the Dutch are willing to condone euthanasia in the earlier stages of dementia because then 
patients are capable of making such a decision. The problem here is that patients are 
euthanized prematurely, when they can have months of quality life. Euthanasia in the later 
stages of dementia is considered wrong because then patients who do not know what is 
happening to them are euthanized, and this contravenes the competency and autonomy 
considerations. Terminating the life of a patient who is not aware of what is happening to her 
is problematic even in the eyes of Dutch experts who condone euthanasia for patients with 
dementia in particular circumstances.5 
 
 
 
 
Therefore, the impact of the Christian democrats in bio-ethical debates has become limited. After a 
long period of dominating the ethical scene in Belgium, Christian democrats no longer have a real 
impact on medico-legal (in case of bioethics) discussions. 
5 
Exchanges with Dr. Bert Keizer (December 29–31, 2012, and July 16, 2013). Dr. Keizer is author of, 
among other works, Dancing with Mr. D (Keizer, 1997). 
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Indeed, the debate regarding the question whether it is legitimate to end lives of patients with 
dementia is not new. Those who support such a practice accentuate the autonomy and self- 
determination of the patient, the dignity of the patient, the patient’s wishes, and 
considerations relating to quality of life. Those who oppose the practice challenge the above 
considerations and argue that end-of-life practices should be confined, if at all, to competent 
patients. Otherwise, there are valid grounds for fear of abuse. I (Cohen-Almagor, 2001, 96– 
112) have debated this issue in the past  with my teacher  and Oxford scholar  Ronald 
Dworkin. Let me elaborate on the pertinent arguments. 
 
IV. WHAT ARE THE BEST INTERESTS OF PATIENTS WITH DEMENTIA? 
Dworkin argues that human life as such is not sacred. Life that includes only animal-like 
experiences without any critical interests is not sacred. InLife’s Dominion, Dworkin (1993, 
236) emphasizes the notion of dignity as the central aspect of the intrinsic importance of 
human life. “Dignity” is utilized to put a high value on human cognition and one’s intellectual 
capacities.6 Dworkin (1993, 201–13) draws a distinction between experiential and critical 
interests, explaining that we all want pleasure and enjoyment in virtue of desires and 
ambitions. We also want to live worthwhile lives. That is, we look at our lives as a kind of 
assignment, a mission. The first kind of interest is called experiential; the second, critical 
interests. 
 
A patient’s right to be treated with dignity is the right that others acknowledge his critical 
interests: that they recognize that he has a moral standing and that it is intrinsically, 
objectively important how his life goes. Many people do not want to be remembered as living 
in circumstances perceived by them as degrading. Patients’ fears about dependence include 
the impact of caring on those responsible for their well-being and the impact on their own 
dignity. Dworkin (1993, 210–12) contends that some people are horrified that their death 
might express an idea that  they detest  as a perversion:  that  mere biological life—just 
hanging on—has independent value. 
 
Dworkin (1993, 215) maintains that when we think of dignity, it is not just life in any form that 
is important. Anyone who believes in the sanctity of human life believes that once a human 
life has started, it is intrinsically important that that life goes well, that the investment it 
represents is realized rather than frustrated. Dworkin explains that when we think of a 
person’s prudential values we think of his life as a whole—past, present, and future. People 
strive to give their lives a certain meaning, structure, and direction. They would not like their 
lives to be marred by a condition that is strikingly at odds with the rest. Dworkin (1993, 230) 
speaks of life as a thematic unity: “when we consider how the fate of a demented person can 
affect the character of his life, we consider the patient’s whole life, not just its sad final 
stages, and we consider his future in terms of how it affects the character of the whole.” 
Accordingly, past desires matter a great deal because they inform the patient’s life project. 
They set the parameters for the project’s continued success. They are so important to the 
extent of trumping the patient’s present interests. 
 
Dworkin (1993, 180, 230–2) has no qualms referring to some patients as vegetables. He 
assumes that harm is being done when a patient is living as a vegetable (1993, 232). 
Dworkin contemplates a case where a person named Margo had executed a formal 
document directing that if  she should develop Alzheimer’s disease or a life-threatening 
disease, she should be euthanized as soon and as painlessly as possible. Dworkin asks 
whether autonomy requires that her wishes be respected now when she is ill, even though 
she seems perfectly happy with her dog-eared mysteries, the single painting she repaints, 
and  her  peanut-butter-and-jelly  sandwiches.  In  such  a  case,  an  apparent  contradiction 
 
 
6 
Others are using the concept of dignity to accentuate the inner worth of personhood and the sanctity 
of life. See Kass, 1991;Pellegrino, Schulman, and Merrill, 2009. 
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seems to exist between past and present wishes, between past and present autonomy. 
Dworkin (1993, 226–33) endorses respecting Margo’s past wishes, arguing that a competent 
person making a living will to provide for her treatment if she becomes demented is making 
the kind of judgment that autonomy, in the integrity view, most respects, a judgment about 
the overall shape of the kind of life she wants to have led. In other words, Dworkin implies 
that a life lacking critical interests is a poor life in terms of its quality. What we seek is not just 
any form of life but rather life in earnest. This reasoning brings him to conclude that a life that 
merely includes peanut-butter-and-jelly sandwiches, and similar trivial things, is not worth 
living. Eating these sandwiches cannot bring a person to consider her life as a kind of 
assignment, as a mission.7 
 
I must demur from Dworkin’s remiss use of the word “vegetable” when referring to human 
beings. People remain beings of the human species notwithstanding their physical or mental 
condition. They still deserve to be treated compassionately, professionally, and morally. 
They should not be treated as we treat an asparagus or kohlrabi. Vegetables are means to 
an end. We use them for survival and pleasure. Humans are never means to an end. 
Humans are always worthy of respect and concern. Furthermore, reducing the notion of 
personhood to the ability to reason does not do it justice. Humans are complex beings with 
many abilities: cognitive, mental, spiritual, emotional, and physical. We derive happiness and 
a sense of satisfaction from many things that are not necessarily related to our ability to 
reason. People can realize themselves, be autonomous, and behave irrationally. People 
may choose to act on emotions rather than logic and reason (Cohen-Almagor, 1994, 9–19). 
People may derive an immense sense of happiness and satisfaction from utter nonsense. 
Contrary to Dworkin’s arguments, my contention is that even the thin pleasure of peanut 
butter and jelly is worthwhile.  Past  autonomous decisions should not  categorically and 
unequivocally trump present nonautonomous life. People may find pleasure in things that 
had no importance for them in the past. Their present order of priorities should not be 
ignored. Four arguments are presented in support of this claim: beneficence, medicine-as-a- 
profession, fluidity of life, and the unattractiveness of death. 
 
A. Beneficence 
Beneficence is the act of doing good. Dworkin emphasizes the patient’s autonomy which is, 
indeed, an important consideration in the treatment of patients. When it comes to treating 
patients with dementia, this important consideration comes into conflict with a no less 
important consideration that guides the work of physicians: being kind and merciful to your 
patients. Do your very best for them. Physicians are duty bound to care for their patients 
(Pellegrino and Thomasma, 1988). Beneficence would dictate continuing to treat Margo, not 
to terminate her life. Acting for Margo’s benefit would dictate making her life as comfortable 
as possible, not ending her life journey because this is something she wanted in the past, 
when she was healthy. 
 
In Belgium, the physician is required to inform the patients who request euthanasia of the 
state of their health and of their life expectancy, discuss with the patients their euthanasia 
request and the therapeutic measures which can still be considered, as well as the 
availability and consequences of palliative care. Euthanasia should be the last resort, after 
exhausting all avenues of showing beneficence to patients. Whether euthanasia is a good 
thing for patients who suffer from dementia is questionable. 
 
B. Medicine-as-a-profession Argument 
 
 
 
7 
Bert Keizer commented: You and me we DO have qualms here. I think you are entirely correct in 
your diagnosis of Dworkin’s problem. His dismissive attitude towards ‘merely’ experiential life is a 
personal quirk, stemming from his own biography as a university-professor who thinks that being 
intellectually active and stunning is THE life worth living. 
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Patients with dementia typically do not suffer from the dementia itself (Gastmans and De 
Lepeleire, 2010, 80). As far as we know, the changes in the brain that occur in dementia do 
not cause pain (Alzheimer’s Australia, 2011). In the last stage of dementia, the vast majority 
of patients are no longer aware of their condition and have no recollection of their 
autonomous self. Now, at what stage would you warrant euthanasia for such patients? I 
have asked some leading physicians who treat such patients in six countries: Israel, the 
United Kingdom, the United States, Canada, Belgium, and the Netherlands, whether they 
would euthanize patients with dementia. Nearly all of them answered unequivocally “No.” 
Generally speaking, physicians are trained to fight to maintain life, not to terminate life. It 
would be inconceivable for the physicians I interviewed to euthanize patients because of 
their past wishes when at present they do not wish to die and when they find some, even 
very limited, meaning in their lives. One Dutch physician, Bert Keizer, said “only in the first 
stage. Later it is too late.” He himself admits that the first stage is too early to depart life but 
thinks that if patients are willing to take the risk of foregoing some pleasant months or a year 
even, then they are in a position to take leave in the early stages.8 
 
First Do No Harm is a guiding principle in medicine. For the majority of physicians, it is 
inconceivable and utterly unprofessional to euthanize patients with dementia in Margo’s 
condition. She would seem to be happy in her small yet significant joys of life, and then 
someone might recall that years ago she filled out an advance directive in which she 
expressed a wish to be euthanized upon becoming demented, and referring to Dworkin, say 
that we should respect the old wish and ignore the present Margo. Many physicians would 
find this argument bizarre and distressing, in direct conflict with their set of beliefs and with 
their professional responsibilities. This, for instance, was Edmund Pellegrino’s view. 
 
C. The Fluidity of Life Argument 
Dworkin thinks that one’s directives are predetermined and unchangeable, but this is not 
necessarily the case. We are not able to know how our lives will look when we are about to 
die. We are not able to say that values and priorities that are important to us now will be as 
important to us until the very last day. The notion of an unchangeable, unified personality is 
doubtful. People do change and these changes may become meaningful to us in 
circumstances that we cannot envisage. Indeed, the very idea of autonomy reflects our 
ability and desire to construct and reshape realities, to re-evaluate values and ideas, to 
renounce old beliefs, and to accommodate ourselves to new situations. People may realize 
their autonomous wishes only to realize later that this was not what they wished for 
themselves and change the course of their lives. 
 
Dworkin assumes that people, as rational agents, may have certain attitudes regarding 
dementia and decide beforehand that some forms of life are repugnant, meaningless, and 
not worth living. People try to assess how their situation might look in the future and decide 
on their destiny according to the data they currently have on the demented state. However, 
people are not only thinking creatures.  Not  all factors can be grasped by our  rational 
faculties. Not all data can be digested by applying reason and judgment. Sometimes we do 
things we could not imagine doing. Sometimes people act in accordance with their 
sentiments rather than in accordance with their brains. Sometimes people are pushed to do 
something by their instincts, their impulses, factors that they find difficult to explain in rational 
terms. On some occasions people are overpowered, overwhelmed by the reality they 
confront, yet humans learn and adjust. They accommodate themselves to situations 
imposed on them. We witness this time and again with people who were involved in 
traumatic injuries as a result of road accidents, acts of terror and of war. The majority of the 
victims opt to continue living. 
 
 
 
8 
Discussion with Dr Bert Keizer, Amsterdam (July 16, 2013) and his comments on this paper. See 
also Rurup, Onwuteaka-Philipsen, Pasman et al (2006). 
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True, patients with dementia express themselves in the experiential way, not in the cognitive 
way; but we cannot say in advance that only a certain level of autonomy is worth living. Life 
is in flux, circumstances are in flux, and personality is in flux. People do change not only as a 
result of facing physical and/or mental deterioration but also as a result of social changes, 
learning, and experiencing new things in life. Patients in Margo’s condition are weakly 
related to their past and similarly weakly related to their future. They thus have only a weak 
basis for prudential concerns about anything but their present and their near future. There is 
no such thing as timeless prudential value (Hawkins, 2014, 523–40). 
 
One can rightly question to what extent Margo can positively respond to previous 
autonomous desires and whether her old putative conception of the good is valid to her 
present condition. The situation we are thus confronting poses a paradox. We should insist 
that only competent, autonomous people may have the option to decide the moment of their 
death when, for them, life is no longer worth living, when it is no longer life in earnest. They 
do not wish to be euthanized prematurely but at some point in the future. Upon reaching that 
point, people are no longer competent and autonomous, and at that point often there is no 
clear indication that they wish to die. It is plausible to assume that —like the victims of 
physical traumas—patients with dementia accommodate to the new circumstances and may 
have changed their priorities and find meaning in other, even mere experiential interests. 
Thus, performing euthanasia prematurely is a shame because it cuts life in earnest. 
Performing euthanasia at a later stage of dementia upon advance directives might not be 
relevant to the present condition and, indeed, might negate the patient’s present wishes. 
Either way, euthanasia of patients with dementia is thus morally wrong. 
 
D. Unattractiveness of Death Argument 
With death, the body returns to earth. For many people, then there is nothing. Death is the 
end of the journey with no further prospects, no promise or hope. From the scientific, 
physical, and empirical perspectives (to be distinguished from the metaphysical, spiritual, 
and religious perspectives), after death there is void. Due to this realization, the majority of 
people cling to life even in the most distressing conditions. When forced to live under 
physical constraints as a result of traumatic events, most people provide explicit and clear 
indication that they wish to continue living (Cohen-Almagor, 2001). These clear indications 
are lacking when patients with dementia are concerned. Only upon experiencing continuous 
suffering that makes life a painful struggle people may find death an attractive proposition. 
Only when life becomes a weighty burden the proposition of death gains attractiveness. The 
majority of patients with dementia are not in this category. 
 
Roughly speaking, dementia is comprised of three stages. In the early stage, signs emerge 
that the patient suffers from dementia. The patient slowly realizes that there is a problem. 
The patient, who is still autonomous, may indicate that she does not wish to live as a 
demented being. Such a life is contrary to her critical interests. Then dementia progresses. 
The patient’s mental faculties deteriorate. She loses her autonomy. Finally, comes the third 
and last stage when the patient leads animal-like or, in Dworkin’s terms, vegetable-like life. 
In many cases, learning is possible, including the correcting of behavior that we deem 
problematic, until late in the process. There are no reciprocal meaningful relationships 
between the patient and the people around her. 
 
Many of the cases are not Margo-like cases. There are patients with dementia whose 
condition has a significant negative impact on their lives. They do not find any satisfaction in 
life. Their condition is irreversible, irrecoverable, distressing, and frustrating. They are fully 
dependent on others for their most basic daily functions and activities. The severe cases 
involve lack of any autonomous functioning in the late stage, following a steady decline 
(Sharp, 2012, 235). The process is very sad and painful, more so to the patient’s loved ones 
(those around the patient’s bed who are important to the patient, who truly care for the 
patient and want her best interests) who witness how the person they loved deteriorates and 
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slowly disappears.9 The patient’s loved ones find it  especially difficult  to cope with the 
noncognitive symptoms of dementia which include the patient’s agitation and her wandering 
around and getting lost. The majority of patients with dementia experience such symptoms 
especially in the second and third stages of the illness (Robinson et al., 2006; Burns and 
Iliffe, 2009a). It is also difficult and quite frustrating for the medical team to treat patients who 
are nonautonomous, nonresponsive, and noncommunicative, who do not show appreciation 
and who require basic and intimate care.10 
 
In the first stage of dementia, patients tend to suffer from fears of becoming a burden on 
loved ones and the medical care, losing independence, and losing one’s dignity (Gastmans 
and De Lepeleire, 2010;Albers, Van den Block, and Vander Stichele, 2014).11 The suffering 
is mental. The suffering can be alleviated with due holistic palliative care that addresses the 
patients’ mental, psychological, physical, and social needs, with assurances that the patients 
have an intrinsic value notwithstanding their deteriorating condition, with family solidarity (Ter 
Meulen and Wright, 2012, 361–8), and with compassion and respect for the patients who are 
now at  a juncture where they need attention more  than ever  before. As patients with 
dementia tend to be elder adults,12 they should be reassured that it is payback time. All their 
lives they gave to others—their children, their friends, their society; now it is their turn to 
receive. The moral imperative is to provide compassion and care for people with dementia. 
 
With the advance of dementia, its distressing symptoms become more frequent (Aminoff and 
Adunsky, 2004; Aminoff and Adunsky, 2006). Dyspnea, pain, and agitation become more 
common as death comes nearer. But all are treatable symptoms. Studies have shown that 
cognitive behavioral therapy, palliative and hospice care could greatly improve the care of 
patients with advanced dementia. Patients with dementia who receive hospice care have 
fewer hospitalizations and milder psychiatric symptoms as compared with those who did not 
receive hospice care (Bekelman et al., 2005; Hughes et al., 2007; Shega et al., 2008; Sachs, 
2009). Furthermore, families of patients with dementia who receive hospice care report 
greater satisfaction with care (Sachs et al., 2004, 19, 1057–63; Sachs, 2009; Shega et al., 
2008). Table 1 summarizes the considerations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
9 
For further discussion, see Pivodic and colleagues (2014). 
10 
A nurse in the Antwerp research seminar who works in a nursing home asked whether there is any 
meaning in treating such patients; whether their lives can be termed “life”. The nurse said he feels that 
he is treating vegetables. He is required to wash them each and every day. Sometimes he is required 
to feed them with a tube. There is no relation between these patients and the nursing home team. 
There is no sharing, no reciprocity. No form of consciousness. The nurse asked: Is there a sense of 
taking care of these people? Interestingly, following my explanation about the difference between 
vegetables and human life, the nurse denied that he used the term “vegetable” only a few minutes 
before. It is certainly challenging to treat human being in such a condition. 
11 
For further discussion on the concept of dignity, see Duwell et al (2014). 
12 
The majority of people with Alzheimer’s are 65 and older. See Alzheimer’s Association, What Is 
Alzheimer’s?,                                   accessed                                   October                                   15, 
2015, http://www.alz.org/alzheimers_disease_what_is_alzheimers.asp. See also Burns and Iliffe 
(2009b, 158). 
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 Table 1. 
Euthanasia of patients with dementia 
 
Stage Autonomous 
consent 
Suffering Required 
care 
Providing 
Euthanasia 
(Time) 
Euthanasia – 
Ethical 
aspects 
 
1 
 
+ 
 
+ 
 
+ 
 
Premature 
 
Problematic 
 
2 
 
- 
 
++ 
 
++ 
 
Questionable 
 
Problematic 
 
3 
 
- 
 
+++ 
 
+++ 
 
Timely 
 
Problematic 
 
Thus, euthanasia of patients with dementia is always problematic. When individuals are 
aware of the complexities of dementia and factor in the contradiction at the end of life 
whereby with severe dementia they will not be able to remember their previous wish and 
may well be pursuing other interests, yet they are making a conscious decision that this is 
the time when their own lives should be terminated, that decision is bound to be fraught with 
doubts: at the onset of the illness death is premature; in the later stage it is questionable 
because the patients show that some aspects of life are still meaningful to them, and in the 
last stage the patients are no longer autonomous to make such a momentous decision and 
the physicians cannot be sure what the patients then want. 
 
The dementia paradox cannot be solved by euthanasia. It needs to be addressed by more 
care, compassion, and good doctoring. The medical team has a crucial part to play in 
promoting quality of care from diagnosis until the last stages of dementia, through 
assessment of changes in cognitive functioning—memory, day-to-day functioning, 
depression, fears, communication difficulties,  and behavior—alongside identification and 
treatment of symptoms (Burns, O’Brien, and Ames, 2005; Downs and Bowers, 2008; Burns 
and Iliffe, 2009b). As Edmund Pellegrino reiterated in many of our conversations about this 
matter, early requests to die are often the result of desperation that the medical staff and the 
patients’ beloved people can forestall by providing the understanding, support, care, and 
sharing that will assure the patients that they are, and will remain, members of the human 
community. What we should do is humanize care for the living rather than dehumanize 
patients and promote their death. 
 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
Although the legalization of euthanasia was finalized without the broad involvement and 
consensus among the medical profession, the acceptance of euthanasia has increased 
among the medical profession from 78% in 2002 to more than 90% in 2009 (Miccinesi et al., 
2005; Smets et al., 2011, 590; Van Wesemael et al., 2012). Social and peer pressure make 
it difficult for those who oppose euthanasia to uphold their position in the liberal culture that 
has been developing. A similar phenomenon has been recorded in the Netherlands following 
the legislation of the Dutch euthanasia law (Cohen-Almagor, 2004, 154). 
 
Johan Bilsen and colleagues (2009, 1120) found that following the Euthanasia Act there was 
an increase in all types of medical end-of-life practices with the exception of the use of life- 
ending drugs without explicit request. 
 
The liberal state has an obligation to protect all people, especially the vulnerable.13 Given 
that ending patients’ lives without request is more common than euthanasia (van der Heide 
 
 
13 
One referee commented that not only the “usual suspects” (minorities, poor) are the most 
vulnerable. It may be white men who are actually most vulnerable to the temptation to request 
euthanasia. They have been socialized to believe that life is not worth living if they are not dominant, 
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et al., 2003, 345–50), and given the significant number of terminal sedation cases 
(Claessens et al., 2008, 325; Bilsen et al., 2009, 1119–21), a call for caution is warranted. 
The Belgians are researching the way their dying patients are being handled in a medical 
context. Their culture of self-searching is certainly necessary. 
 
In Belgium, patients who have advance directives requesting to stop treatment upon 
becoming severely demented will have their request honored. Their treatment will be 
stopped together with their artificial feeding and they will die.14 I have argued that in the early 
stage when the patient is autonomous, death would come much too early. In the second and 
third stages, the patient is no longer competent and autonomous to decide. Those who 
surround the patient suffer as they witness the mental deterioration of their loved one. But 
their suffering should not dictate the medical treatment of the patient. The patient, like Margo 
in the Dworkin example, may find satisfaction in experiential interests. For these patients, 
present experiential interests might be more important than critical interests that were voiced 
in the past. One is in no position to discard them merely because they seem low in the minds 
of healthy people. Something that has a limited value in the present may gain enormous 
meaning in the future. One may argue that then experiential interests become for patients 
with dementia critical interests. These are the essential things in their lives. 
 
Opinion polls indicate that the majority of the Belgian public, 85% to 93% of them, support 
euthanasia (a growing support after 2002) (Cohen et al., 2006, 663–9; Cohen-Almagor, 
2009a). This support is similar to the support of the medical profession. It would be coercive 
to deny them what they perceive as a fundamental right. But the history of euthanasia in 
Belgium is young. The Euthanasia Act was passed only in 2002, and the country is still in the 
early learning stages. What is disconcerting is the fast move to press forward further end-of- 
life practices without paying ample attention to caution. One cautionary barrier after the other 
is removed to allow greater scope for euthanasia (Cohen-Almagor,  2013; Siegel et al., 
2014; Vincent et al., 2014). The scope of tolerance toward the practice is enlarged so that, 
as yesterday’s red light becomes obsolete today and as one qualification is removed, 
practitioners and law makers are already debating a further step and other groups (patients 
who are tired of life, children, patients with dementia) to be included within the more liberal 
euthanasia policy as if the restrictive logic behind the Euthanasia Act were no longer valid. 
This is quite astonishing because human lives are at stake. What is required is a careful 
study, accumulation of knowledge and data, addressing the above concerns, learning from 
mistakes, and attempting to correct them before rushing in a frenzied fashion to introduce 
more liberal ways to euthanize patients. Haste makes waste. 
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independent, and fully in control. In case of a severe illness, if they lose their “autonomy,” some men 
will believe that their lives are completely useless. See Krag (2014). 
14 
Bert Keizer commented: In the Netherlands too. This is considered normal practice. We as a rule 
do NOT give patients with dementia a nasogastric tube for feeding if they no longer eat properly. It is 
a mild death and is regarded as the inevitable course of the disease. 
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